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The last two decades have seen an emergence of new forms of international 
employee representation within multinational corporations (MNCs). In EU 
member states, the management at MNCs find themselves having to deal with 
statutory European Works Councils (EWCs) while at a more global level some 
studies show a multiplication of solidarity networks and cross-border union 
alliances put in place by reinvigorated Global Union Federations (GUFs). In 
order to evaluate the extent to which these cross-border alliances can support the 
development of transnational collective bargaining within MNCs, this article 
draws on a single case study conducted recently in a Canadian MNC in the 
commercial printing industry, namely Quebecor World Inc. In recent years, 
before the dismantling of this Canadian multinational, union officials sought to 
coordinate the various unions in this company internationally and to open up a 
new space for collective bargaining at the transnational level by negotiating an 
international framework agreement with its management.  
 
 
ver the last thirty years, neoliberal globalization, coupled with the 
rise in power of multinational corporations (MNCs), have put union 
organizations on the defensive. While this observation has been 
widely documented and can be generalized to all industrialized countries (Glyn 
2010; Dunn 2005), several studies have highlighted the particular intensity with 
which these developments have occurred in the North-American context, where 
multinational employers have increasingly used coercive comparison, 
confrontational negotiation strategies, and even anti-union practices (Mac Neil 
2010; Peters 2010; Moody 2007). These new realities have thus put union 
organizations under pressure, forcing them to renew their repertoire of actions 
and to invest more energetically in the global space (Evans 2010; Frege and Kelly 
2004).  
O
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Among the different structures and models for action that are currently 
emerging, solidarity networks and cross-border alliances, whose implementation 
is often initiated by Global Union Federations (GUFs), stand out as one of the 
most popular initiatives used today to counterbalance the growing power of 
MNCs. While the creation of such networks and alliances is not a new 
phenomenon, recent studies suggest that the current context of globalization is 
contributing to their resurgence (Bieler and Lindberg 2011; Croucher and Cotton 
2009; Bronfenbrenner 2007; Stevis and Boswell 2007; Harrod and O’Brien 2002). 
These studies, however, leave many unanswered questions due to the limited 
attention given to date to these networks and alliances, notably the extent to 
which they can support the development of transnational collective bargaining 
within MNCs.  
In order to explore this issue, this article draws on a single case study 
conducted between 2005 and 2008 on a Canadian MNC in the commercial 
printing industry, namely Quebecor World Inc. In recent years, union officials 
dealing with this Canadian multinational sought to coordinate the various 
unions in this company internationally and to open up a new space for collective 
bargaining at the transnational level by negotiating an international framework 
agreement2 (IFA) with its management. This negotiation process, under the 
leadership of the Union Network International3 (UNI), led to the establishment of 
a new form of cross-border alliance, known as “UNI Network @ Quebecor 
World,” and initiated a worldwide campaign for union rights. Ambitious in 
scope, this campaign entailed the coordination of various solidarity actions 
through the involvement of unions from more than a dozen countries.  
Starting from this context, the analysis conducted in this article is based on 
empirical data gathered from multiple sources. The core database comprises a 
series of 40 semi-structured interviews with direct participants in this network. 
Carried out from 2005 to 2008, these interviews were conducted in 
approximately ten different countries, in Europe and in North and South 
America. Participants were selected according to their position within each union 
and their involvement in the network. More specifically, the data collection 
strategy used in our study first involved meeting a number of union actors who 
were affiliated, in particular, with the Communications, Energy, and 
Paperworkers Union of Canada (CEP) and with UNI, both recognized as playing 
a key role in creating and leading this network. These initial contacts with “UNI 
Network @ Quebecor World” officials opened the way for us to attend meetings 
organized by this group, which enabled us to meet the union representatives 
taking part and to observe the dynamics characterizing the internal operations of 
this network. When necessary, we also interviewed some of these union 
representatives in their respective countries in order to deepen our 
understanding of certain dimensions related to the activities carried out by this 
alliance and these representatives’ degree of involvement. These first contacts in 
the field, moreover, led us to understand that “UNI Network @ Quebecor 
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World” was actually a disparate collection of union organizations located in 
various territories. As part of our study, we interviewed, among many others, 
presidents of local union organizations in South America, national advisors from 
central labour bodies in Europe and North America, and representatives from a 
GUF. Despite the diversity of the positions they held, these union officials all 
shared the role of representing their union organization internationally, 
reporting on the situation at the company in their respective countries, agreeing 
on the action strategies to be adopted, and coordinating the mobilization of their 
members. The interviews began with an exploration of the general events that 
had taken place and then moved on to a more detailed examination of the 
process by which an international framework agreement had been negotiated.  
While this material constitutes the core of the research data, it was 
complemented by observation during union meetings and by documentary 
materials, including those posted on an official web site of the UNI which 
provided access to information published by different national and local union 
organizations representing Quebecor World workers. Other sources of 
information included a large body of documentation made up of many corporate 
documents, several articles from the print media describing the financial 
situation of the corporation and the state of its labour relations, and minutes of 
European Works Council meetings. Additional information was also collected 
during various visits to plants and meetings with workers.  
Our analysis is structured as follows. In the first section, we will set the scene 
with a brief historical overview of global workers’ representation structures 
within MNCs and their impact on the development of transnational collective 
bargaining. Second, we will present the case of the cross-border union alliance 
that was established within Quebecor World. A description of the processes 
leading to the creation of this alliance and the poles of strategic actions 
developed by its members within the framework of a transnational corporate 
campaign called “Justice @ Quebecor,” will be followed by an analysis of the 
negotiation process leading to the international framework agreement co-signed 
in 2007 by this union network and the management at Quebecor World. The 
conclusion of this article offers an examination of the lessons that can be drawn 
from the case study and a discussion of future prospects for transnational 
collective bargaining at the level of MNCs. 
 
DEVELOPING SUPRANATIONAL WORKERS’ REPRESENTATION 
STRUCTURES WITHIN MNCs 
 
The institutionalization of global workers’ representation structures in MNCs 
is not a new phenomenon. The first instruments developed by unions within 
multinationals were put in place during the 1960-70s and took the form of World 
Works Councils (WWCs), originally established in the automotive sector 
(Bendiner 1977; Litvak and Maule 1972). In fact, the first WWCs were set up 
21   Just Labour: A Canadian Journal of Work and Society—Volume 17 & 18   
 
between June 1966 and November 1968 in five major companies in the 
automotive sector (namely Ford, General Motors, Chrysler, 
Volkswagen/Mercedes-Benz and Fiat-Citroën) before spreading to other sectors 
under the leadership of the GUFs4, which encouraged the creation of these 
Councils in order to coordinate union action and provide for the exchange of 
information (Gallin 2008).  
The mixed results from the experiences of these first WWCs, which did not 
lead to the breakthroughs expected in terms of transnational collective 
bargaining, drew attention to the obstacles blocking union cooperation and 
effective transnational collective bargaining (Windmuller 2000). These obstacles 
became the subject of academic debate during the 1970s and 1980s. Many studies 
were carried out, identifying a wide variety of obstacles such as the constant 
refusal on the part of the management of most MNCs to recognize GUFs as 
bargaining parties, and the lack of enthusiasm on the part of national union 
organizations to transfer part of their responsibility to the international level or 
even grant the players at this level sufficient resources to efficiently carry out the 
tasks involved (Northrup and Rowan 1979). The differences in collective 
bargaining structures and practices in the various countries, the divergent views 
between the unions in developed countries and those in developing countries, 
and the lack of interest in international solidarity among members of the national 
unions in industrialized countries were also examples put forward by these 
authors to explain why international collective bargaining was not highly 
developed (Bourque 2008).  
While these barriers to union cooperation weakened, and in many cases, 
completely stalled early attempts to build efficient global workers’ representation 
structures within MNCs, the current context of globalization combined with the 
growing strength of transnational enterprises seems to have revived the desire of 
the trade union movement to rely on cross-border alliances. In this regard, 
regional integration processes have, since the early 1990s, created new 
opportunities for international cooperation among labour unions and 
contributed to the emergence of new instances of representation. In the 
Americas, trade agreements have revitalized the concrete need to build new 
international solidarities for trade unions, as evidenced by the astonishing 
number of solidarity networks that have emerged, allowing for the 
implementation of real collaboration between worker’s representatives and 
leading, in several cases, to progress in the defence of social and trade union 
rights in MNCs (Anner 2007; Armbruster 2005; Kay 2005). Nonetheless, the 
European Union stands as the most successful model for cross-border union 
collaboration through its legislated obligation for companies with activities in 
more than one EU country to bring together employee representatives for the 
purposes of consultation within a European Works Council (EWC) (Aballéa and 
Mias 2010; Béthoux 2008). However, while the innovative nature of these EWCs 
is generally recognized, their potential in terms of supporting the development 
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of transnational collective bargaining within MNCs is still the subject of intense 
debate in the literature between so-called ‘Euro-pessimists’ and ‘Euro-optimists.’5 
Apart from this ongoing debate, some unions have sought to go beyond the 
regional boundaries of EWCs and really invest in the transnational space by 
developing new forms of cross-border union alliances. These alliances can be 
defined as groups of union organizations from different countries that represent 
workers from the same MNC, with the aim of enforcing their fundamental rights. 
Under the leadership of some GUFs which have recently made their 
establishment a strategic priority,6 these cross-border alliances are attracting 
growing interest among organizations seeking to respond to the negative effects 
of globalization and the increasing power of MNCs (Croucher and Cotton 2009).  
Recently, cross-border union alliances have been active on many fronts, 
notably in the organization of transnational corporate campaigns and the 
negotiation of IFAs. Our knowledge concerning these alliances and the process 
by which these IFAs were negotiated, however, remains limited. In this regard, 
several questions remain, such as the extent to which these alliances allow for the 
development of new means of action for the union movement and support the 
development of transnational collective bargaining within MNCs. In this regard, 
the alliance that took shape within the multinational Quebecor World provides 
an interesting basis for reflection. 
 
THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS OF AN INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK 
AGREEMENT AT QUEBECOR WORLD INC. 
 
Founded in 1965 by Pierre Péladeau, a well-known French Canadian 
businessman, Quebecor Inc., which began as a small Quebec-based newspaper 
publisher, became an important Canadian communications company whose 
activities were grouped around two poles. The media pole, better known under 
its corporate name, Quebecor Media Inc., included all of the company's activities 
related to the field of telecommunications, newspaper publishing and cable 
services. The industrial pole of Quebecor was formed, for its part, by one of the 
world’s largest commercial printing companies, Quebecor World Inc. In 2008, 
this subsidiary of Quebecor employed approximately 28,000 workers in a 
ramified network of more than 115 printing and related facilities in 17 countries, 
spread mainly over three regional spaces, namely North America, Latin America 
and Europe. 
The history of Quebecor World was marked by steady growth which took 
place through the use, simultaneously, of an aggressive strategy of acquisitions 
and strategic expansions in various international markets. This growth, however, 
showed very clear signs of abating as of the early 2000s. The economic slowdown 
due to the disruption of the publishing market as well as greater-than-expected 
challenges related to the integration of World Color Press, a large American 
commercial printing company with which Quebecor World merged in 1999, led 
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to the gradual weakening of the company’s economic situation and competitive 
positioning.  
To find a way out of this precarious situation, Quebecor management 
adopted a program involving: (a) a strategy of cost reduction and disposing of 
facilities which were not part of its core business, (b) the establishment of a 
retooling program involving the purchase of new presses and new higher-
performance equipment; and (c) the closing of the less productive plants (UNI 
2006). These downsizing and restructuring measures resulted in many job cuts 
that affected most of the company’s installations. As of the early 2000s, more 
than 15,000 jobs were lost within the company, equivalent to a third of its total 
workforce. 
The deterioration of the company’s economic situation and the series of 
restructuring measures adopted had a major impact on relations between the 
company’s management and its worker representatives around the world, a 
phenomenon which was particularly acute in North America. In Canada, despite 
the efforts deployed by the employer to ensure that the investments the company 
had recently made in its establishments were accompanied by union concessions, 
collective bargaining took place, for the most part, without any major conflict. 
One CEP official described the state of labour relations within Quebecor 
establishments in Canada as follows: 
 
I mean, just because we don’t like their strategy and things like that, that’s one thing 
[…] But they’re not aggressively anti-union [...] maybe because we’re already 
unionized. […] It’s a question of them being out to pursue their agenda. And they 
pursue it more negatively and aggressively in Canada than they used to. But 
nowhere near the negative and aggressive level in the United States. I mean, it’s a 
question of degree. It’s not like, you know, everything is rosy here in Canada […] But 
we have a manageable relationship (Interview with a Canadian unionist, Ottawa, 
November 2006). 
 
As shown by the above quote, labour relations in the company’s American 
plants, on the other hand, continued to be marked by a high level of conflict. The 
process of unionization at some Quebecor plants, initiated in the later years by 
the Teamsters Graphic Communications Conference (GCC/IBT), led to truly epic 
battles with the local management at these plants (Tate 2006). The union actors 
involved in these processes, moreover, reported having paid the price of 
“aggressive anti-union campaigns, including threats, harassment and 
intimidation” (UNI 2006: 34). Furthermore, in plants that were already 
unionized, negotiations surrounding the renewal of collective agreements often 
led to strikes or lock-outs. This was notably the case in 2005 at the plant in 
Effingham (Illinois) where the workers faced the closing of their plant after a 
strike was launched. 
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THE CREATION OF THE “UNI NETWORK @ QUEBECOR WORLD” 
  
It is within this context of restructuring and strained labour relations that the 
first contacts between Quebecor World employee representatives took place. 
From the beginning, union representatives from many countries (such as 
Canada, the U.S., France and Sweden) as well as the GUF representing workers 
in the commercial printing sector, (i.e., the UNI) were at the heart of this process. 
In 2000, recognizing the problems of access to unionization in some Quebecor 
World facilities, these union organizations, with the help of the sectoral division 
of UNI, UNI Graphical, held the first international meeting aimed at promoting 
the development of contacts between Quebecor World trade union 
representatives throughout the world. These meetings between union 
representatives, notably from Europe and the Americas, provided an 
opportunity to formalize the existence of a working group called “UNI Network 
@ Quebecor World.”7  
This international meeting allowed union representatives from various 
countries to exchange information and report on their conflictual relations with 
the company. They acknowledged, in particular, the widespread difficulty of 
being recognized as legitimate interlocutors by the management at various local 
establishments and described the various actions they had taken in this regard. 
In Latin America, workers’ representatives described various organizing 
campaigns under which several allegations of anti-union behaviour were 
addressed to local managers (UNI 2006). In Europe, several union 
representatives spoke about the lack of cooperation on the part of company 
management, first, in terms of negotiating the agreement ratified on March 5, 
2003 to set up a European Works Council (EWC) in Quebecor World, and then, 
in terms of participation in this Council. The most notable actions, however, were 
carried out in the United States, in the context of a large-scale unionization 
campaign led by the Graphic Communications International Union (GCIU) with 
the aim of increasing the number of unionized workers in Quebecor World 
facilities. Launched in 2002, this campaign, organized jointly with the AFL-CIO 
and based on a strong mobilization of rank-and-file members, targeted 
approximately ten plants concentrated in parts of the southern United States 
(Tate 2006).  
These problems concerning the recognition of union legitimacy, coupled with 
concerns on the part of some union representatives about workers’ health and 
safety in different company facilities, strengthened the desire of these union 
representatives to consult and meet each other on a more regular basis. To this 
end, further meetings between members of this network were organized and 
new goals and targets were set at the international level, including the opening of 
a new space for negotiation with company officials in order to conclude an IFA. 
Thus, having begun as an organ for consultation and information exchange 
between union representatives, the UNI Network decided more ambitiously to 
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position itself as a legitimate international interlocutor with the management of 
this Canadian multinational.  
 
THE OPENING OF NEGOTIATIONS AND THE LAUNCH OF THE “JUSTICE @ 
QUEBECOR" CAMPAIGN 
 
Having agreed on the objective to negotiate an IFA, members of the UNI 
Network soon tried to contact the company's management starting in early 2003. 
The multiple letters sent by the network, and co-signed by UNI and various 
national union representatives, however, remained unanswered. Faced with this 
refusal to engage in dialogue, the UNI Network sought to increase pressure on 
Quebecor management by organizing a global mobilization campaign: 
 
We approached the company about starting a dialogue on negotiating a global 
agreement on labour standards. We sent a letter to the company signed by UNI and, 
I think, 23 leaders of national unions around the world. We sent that letter asking 
them to engage in dialogue, but they didn’t answer. We sent it again, and they still 
didn’t answer. So we decided we needed to organize a campaign (Interview with a 
Canadian unionist, Ottawa, November 2006). 
 
2003 was a pivotal year in the evolution of the cross-border union alliance at 
Quebecor World and for the GCIU campaign in the United States. A large 
gathering of UNI Network members was held from December 5-10, 2003 in 
Memphis, Tennessee. As part of this Global Quebecor Solidarity Conference, 
more than 120 union delegates and workers from 14 different countries came 
together and made the decision to increase pressure on the company worldwide 
and to officially launch the “Justice @ Quebecor” campaign.  
Many strategies and means of action were established in the framework of 
this campaign. For example, various solidarity actions were organized, such as 
the series of “global solidarity days” that followed the conference in Memphis, 
during which workers at Quebecor plants all over the world wore “Justice @ 
Quebecor” stickers and T-shirts, signed a petition supporting global labour rights 
and, in some cases, staged rallies at their own plants. A public awareness 
campaign was also organized during which union representatives from 
Quebecor as well as workers from the company’s unorganized plants attended 
various shareholder meetings forcing the Chairman of the Board, former 
Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, to spend much of these meetings 
dealing with workers’ rights. Pressure was also put on Quebecor World 
customers in order to raise awareness among them of the UNI Network’s 
demands. Knowing that Quebecor printed catalogues and flyers for a number of 
major retailers, GCIU members sent leaflets to many of these retailers, urging 
them to demand that Quebecor respect the right of workers to organize.  
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Trade unions in Europe also played a key role in the development of this pole 
of strategic action by targeting companies in their respective countries that were 
Quebecor World customers and had signed an IFA, with the aim of making the 
most of these agreements. Indeed, while IFAs primarily concern the union 
organizations and MNCs that have signed them, some of these agreements 
notably include more or less binding clauses extending their normative content 
to subcontractors and suppliers.8 Steps were taken by Spanish and Swedish trade 
unions, respectively, to put pressure on Telefónica and IKEA, both Quebecor 
World customers, to honour the IFAs they had signed by encouraging the 
management at Quebecor to respect the fundamental rights of its workers. In this 
regard, as pointed out in the following quote by a Swedish unionist, the contacts 
established with IKEA were especially fruitful because of the importance of the 
contract held by Quebecor World to print IKEA catalogues: 
 
I called IKEA and I told them that we were preparing an article for one of the biggest 
newspapers in Sweden and that we knew that IKEA had a good reputation, that they 
had a code of conduct and some policies regarding sub-contractors. They had an 
international framework agreement with wood workers. So I told IKEA that they 
were not applying these mechanisms correctly because of Quebecor. In response, 
they asked me “can you hold this for a week or so?” The management at IKEA spoke 
with the management at Quebecor. Quebecor and their headquarters in Canada were 
really upset about it, really upset. You know, the contract with IKEA is worth 
millions and millions of dollars (Interview with a Swedish unionist, Brighton, 
November 2006). 
 
European trade union representatives at Quebecor World also played a 
crucial role in mobilizing the European institutional structures promoting the 
establishment of social dialogue within MNCs to support UNI Network 
demands for a global labour standards agreement. Despite the problems 
associated with its operation, union representatives succeeded in including a 
discussion on IFAs in the agenda of an EWC meeting.  
Thus, at this conference in Memphis, two campaigns which ended up 
mutually reinforcing one another came together. That is, the campaign 
concerning the unionization of new Quebecor World plants in the United States, 
and  which, carried out at the global level,  sought to conclude an agreement 
with the company on minimum working conditions. As stated by a union 
official: 
 
We kind of married this global agreement thing with the corporate campaigning stuff 
that the Americans were doing. And we kind of brought those two concepts together 
at the global level. And I think that was a gutsy move… in a sense, I think, it 
happened out of necessity. Because the only other option was to walk away, which 
was not a good option (Interview with a Canadian unionist, Ottawa, November 
2006). 
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NEGOTIATION AND RATIFICATION OF AN INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK 
AGREEMENT  
 
The new means of action put forward by the union representatives and 
workers at Quebecor World soon began to have an impact on the IFA negotiation 
process. Company officials, almost two years after the first contacts were made, 
finally agreed to establish an initial dialogue with UNI Network representatives: 
 
So they started speaking to us at that point. I mean, at that point, we went to 
Montreal to speak to the Vice President of Human Resources. […] I mean, this VP 
was very suspicious and didn’t have any idea who we were. So there was a lot of 
explaining to do (Interview with a UNI delegate, Nyon, April 2006). 
 
These preliminary talks led to a series of meetings and, rapidly, to a first tacit 
agreement between the parties. Efforts by trade union members in the UNI 
Network were rewarded when Quebecor officials agreed, in June 2005, to sign a 
protocol on international labour rights. To this end, UNI was informed by 
company management that the protocol, on which a tacit agreement had been 
reached, would be submitted to the company’s Board of Directors in August in 
order to formalize ratification (UNI 2006). However, what should have been a 
mere formality led instead to a major turnabout on the part of company 
management and became a point of contention in the negotiation process: 
 
So we had an agreement. And it had been worked out, down to the last comma. It 
was supposed to go to the board on August 4,, 2005. I mean they told us that it was 
just a formality […] In the end, I don’t know whether it went to the board or not. We 
kept trying to get in touch with them. And they just didn’t reply. This wall of silence 
just came up […] (Interview with a UNI delegate, Nyon, April 2006). 
 
Instead of submitting the agreement to its Board of Directors, Quebecor 
officials changed their strategy and asked for further changes to the agreement 
which, according to union representatives, would “deny the principles of the 
initial Declaration” (UNI 2006). Given the impasse, members of the UNI 
Network indicated their surprise in a letter to Pierre Karl Péladeau, CEO of 
Quebecor World and son of the company founder, urging him to reconsider the 
company’s position and ratify the agreement previously reached. After several 
months, company officials finally proposed a new agreement which UNI 
Network leaders immediately judged to be unacceptable. The main point of 
contention concerned the company’s demand to integrate into the agreement a 
paragraph stressing its non-legally binding nature.  
During the month of May 2006, some changes took place within the 
company. Pierre Karl Péladeau, at the head of Quebecor World, was replaced by 
Wes Lucas, formerly with the U.S. company Sun Chemical. According to some 
union representatives, this change brought a breath of renewal to the ongoing 
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negotiations. From this change, a more traditional process of negotiation 
between the parties emerged. The company manifested its desire to sign an IFA, 
using the text of the original 2005 agreement as a working basis. Several points of 
negotiation were added and discussed. Union negotiators sought, for example, to 
introduce the concept of “neutrality” into the agreement to force the company 
not just to “respect” basic worker and union rights but to commit to remaining 
neutral and not interfering in or opposing its employees’ efforts to unionize: 
 
One of the main issues was around the question of the right to organize and 
enforcement and what we wanted was the word “neutrality” included and we 
wanted a meeting on demand (Interview with a Canadian unionist, Ottawa, July 
2007). 
 
After several months of negotiation and consultations, talks between 
Quebecor officials and the UNI Network delegation eventually led to an 
agreement to respect and promote international labour rights in the company’s 
operations, subsidiaries and suppliers, as laid out in the “Joint Statement on the 
Respect and Promotion of International Labour Standards.”9 This IFA, ratified on 
May 4, 2007 in Barcelona, demonstrated the company’s commitment to respect 





APPRAISING THE SUCCESS OF THE “UNI NETWORK @ QUEBECOR WORLD” 
 
The ratification of the IFA at Quebecor was the fruit of a long negotiation 
process that evolved irregularly but which stands out in terms of the strong 
international union mobilization involved. The main union representatives who 
participated in the negotiation of this agreement were keen to emphasize the 
importance of having relied on a cross-border alliance to establish a balance of 
power which proved to be indispensable to the conclusion of this negotiation 
process: 
 
We’ve had other agreements where we’ve gone to the company, and the president 
would say “Fine, nice idea, write it down and I’ll sign it” […] but nobody else was 
involved. So it doesn’t move anywhere after that. Whereas, when it’s combined with 
this kind of campaign, with the mobilization of rank-and-file people, it means that 
once the agreement is in place, they are ready to enforce it. And that’s why this 
Quebecor thing has been one of the most interesting (Interview with an UNI 
delegate, Nyon, April 2006). 
 
The importance of this agreement should be evaluated in light of the fact that 
it is only the second IFA to have been signed by a company with its headquarters 
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in North America, the first having been concluded in 2001 between the Uniting 
Food, Farm and Hotel Workers World-Wide (IUF) and the management of 
Chiquita, one of the largest producers of bananas worldwide whose 
headquarters is located in Cincinnati, U.S.A. (Riisgaard 2005). In fact, out of the 
sixty IFAs in existence, only seven have been signed by non-EU MNCs 
(Papadakis 2008). This fact explains why IFAs are sometimes viewed as a 
European initiative to foster respect for fundamental labour rights and 
demonstrates the importance of the agreement signed by this Canadian 
multinational.   
In addition to the signing of the IFA, the actions carried out by the trade 
unions in the context of these campaigns also led to other forms of progress for 
the workers of this MNC. In the United States, such actions led Quebecor World 
union representatives to conclude a “neutrality” agreement10 on May 5, 2005, co-
signed by the management of Quebecor World and the GCC/IBT11 providing for 
a new unionization procedure which was more favourable to unions than that set 
out in the U.S. regulatory framework. It did not take long, moreover, for the 
effects of this agreement to be felt. A few months after it was signed, workers at 
Quebecor plants in Fernley, Nevada and Versailles, Kentucky voted in favour of 
joining the GCC/IBT, thus bringing to fruition unionization efforts that had been 
initiated several years earlier. In South America, international solidarity actions 
implemented as part of UNI Network activities also played a crucial role in the 
unionization of some Quebecor plants, such as in Recife, Brazil, but also in 
Santiago, Chile and, more recently, in Lima, Peru. An AFL-CIO representative 
praised the concrete results of these UNI Network activities as follows: 
 
To me, one of the exciting things about this campaign was that it produced real 
results in the US. There are workers today in Kentucky, who have a union that didn’t 
before because of this campaign. And there are workers today in Chile, and Brazil, 
and Peru who didn’t before. So it wasn’t just, you know, can workers over here help 
Americans? It was really: how do we come together to help everyone? And there 
were real results in several countries as a result of this (Interview with an American 
unionist, Washington, May 2007).  
 
Thus, the case of the UNI Network shows the potential of new cross-border 
union alliances in terms of supporting the development of transnational 
collective bargaining. By creating a space for cooperation between trade unions 
representing workers from the same MNC, these alliances could facilitate the 
establishment of common objectives among unions and the building of new 
transnational bargaining strategies. In a context marked by the absence of any 
legal framework for transnational collective bargaining at the company level, 
union organizations must continue to build stronger transnational networks 
based on new international solidarities if they wish to develop an efficient 
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countervailing power within MNCs and address processes of transnational 
collective bargaining without being disadvantaged.  
 
NOTES 
                                                           
1  Assistant Professor at the department of Human Resources Management at HEC 
Montréal (Canada) and researcher at the Inter-University Research Centre on 
Globalization and Work (Centre de recherche interuniversitaire sur la mondialisation 
et le travail - CRIMT) . 
2  IFAs can be defined as agreements, usually concluded between an MNC and a GUF, 
on certain principles which, “while they do not constitute collective bargaining 
agreements in the same sense as agreements reached at the national and local levels, 
provide a rights framework to encourage recognition and bargaining to take place at 
those levels” (ICFTU 2004:22). The first examples of such framework agreements 
emerged in the late 1980s, but their numbers only began to increase significantly 
starting in 2000. Today, there are approximately 62 IFAs in existence, covering 
approximately 5.3 million workers, most of them concluded by companies with a 
seat within the EU (Papadakis 2008).  
3  UNI is the global union for skills and services, representing more than 900 unions in 
150 countries with 15 million affiliated members. 
4  Formerly known as International Trade Secretariats (ITSs). 
5  Certainly, for those who have been described as ‘Euro-pessimists’, this potential is 
bleak. In this regard, different studies have shown that EWCs, in some cases, have 
facilitated rather than impeded management-led restructuring and have generated 
“consent for downsizing” without its being connected “to an extension of collective 
bargaining” (Greer and Hauptmeier 2008:78-9). Nonetheless, in recent years, another, 
much more optimistic scenario has emerged, proposing that EWCs are not only a 
tool for communication between MNC officials and European employee 
representatives but can also be seen as a way to promote transnational collective 
bargaining. The empirical studies supporting this argument tend to show that a 
number of EWCs have, for example, been able to help ensure that employment and 
social concerns are taken into account in restructuring processes. As was pointed out 
in a recent report from the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and 
Working Conditions, “this often occurs in an informal and hard-to-measure way, and 
as a process, but there are a small number of known cases where management and 
the EWC have concluded some type of written agreement essentially on 
restructuring matters”5 (Eurofound 2008:11).  
6  For example, it should be pointed out that the IMF has revived some of its WWCs 
and that the Union Network International (UNI) has, for its part, created a number of 
international union networks at the MNC level. 
7  Hereafter: “UNI Network.” 
8  The degree to which they are binding varies because global union federations did not 
develop a common approach in this regard. In the case of the IFAs signed by 
Telefónica and IKEA, these agreements limit the obligation of the multinational 
company to “informing or encouraging subcontractors and suppliers to respect the 
principles set out in the agreement” (Bourque 2005:13).  
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9  In this IFA, the management at Quebecor World agreed not to use forced labour or 
child labour, to prohibit all forms of employment discrimination and to ensure that 
all of its employees would have equal opportunity. The company also agreed to 
respect freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining and to provide 
its workers with a safe and secure working environment. To this end, the agreement 
included explicit references to some fundamental ILO conventions, namely: (1) the 
freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining (Conventions 87 and 98); 
(2) the exclusion of all forms of forced or compulsory labour (Convention 105); (3) the 
effective abolition of child labour (Conventions 138 and 182); (4) the elimination of 
discrimination in respect of employment and occupation (Conventions 100 and 111). 
The content of the agreement can be found at the following link: 
http://www.uniglobalunion.org/apps/iPortal.nsf/3100172b0315a124c125717d005d
d9bb/b1c66c92bf1d9f86c12575550057c41c/$FILE/UNI-Quebecor-en.pdf 
10  This 24-page protocol stipulates, in particular, that Quebecor employees can vote in 
favour of, or against union representation by means of a supervised secret-ballot 
vote. The protocol thus provides for an accelerated secret-ballot election when 
requested by a union representing at least 30% of employees in the prospective 
bargaining unit in any non-unionized facility. This election must take place within 21 
days of the request and be organized by a neutral arbitrator designated by the parties 
rather than by the U.S. Labor Relations Board in order to avoid excessive delays. 
11  The Graphic Communications International Union (GCIU) represented all workers at 
Quebecor World plants in Canada and the United States until 2005. That year, for 
strategic reasons, the GCIU merged with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters 
in the United States, thus forming the Teamsters Graphic Communications 
Conference (GCC/IBT). In Canada, however, the majority of local unions in the 
GCIU rejected the merger with the Teamsters, voting instead in favour of a merger 
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